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Railroad Performance vs. Capital Investments
During the Transportation Crisis in the USSR,
193 1-35
BY GEORGE NOVAK
THE rapid growth of railroad freight traffic and the steady improve-
ment of most operating indexes during the 1920's must have led
Soviet planners to think that the railroads could continue increasing
the volume of freight traffic they carried simply by raising the standards
of their operating efficiency without making any substantial capital
investment. The warnings of some conscientious railroad economists
and engineers were discarded as typifying a "theory of limits" and,
instead of providing an allocation of investments reasonably balanced
between heavy industry and railroads, Soviet planners preferred to
rely on constantly increasing pressure and minimum investment in the
railroad plant.
This disproportionate allocation of investments in favor of heavy
industry led, in the first two years of the Second Five Year Plan, to
a general transportation crisis despite the high pressure on railroads
toincreasetheir operating efficiency.Transportation difficulties,
which developed as early as 1930, were described by an official Soviet
publication on transportation in the following terms:1
Railroad transportation started off the year 1931 in poor condition.
Its deterioration, which began in the middle of 1930, reached a low
point in the first two months of 1931 when average daily carloadings
declined to 38,800 in January and 36,000 in February. At this time
transportation was the main cause for the underfulfillment of output
plans in industry.Some enterprises accumulated masses of un-
shipped output (about one million tons of fuel in the Donbas
alone); giant construction projects and factories remained without
building raw materials, which caused a standstill in production.
Instead of increasing, the level of industrial production dropped in
January 1931 because of transportation difficulties, and in February
1931 it was back at the level of February 1930. As a result, industry
fell below the level it had reached in December 1930, and suffered
a setback which disorganized it quite considerably. .
Transportationreally became a bottleneck in the economy.
17,1931,No. 11.12, 92.
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The appeal of J4nuary 15, 1931, was a turning point in the
work of the railroads..
Averagedaily carloading increased to 49,300 in April, com-
pared to 86,000 in February; the average number of bad-order
locomotives declined from 158 per day in February to 61 in April;
freight car-kilometers per active freight car increased from 65.4 in
February to 92.3 in April.
However, in spite of the recovery of railroad transportation,
the measures taken to sustain this recovery proved insufficient. Rail-
road transportation did not expand as rapidly as the building of
socialism in our country.
In quantitative terms, however, the backlog of unshipped freight
was quite sinai! at this early stage compared to the backlog which
developed iii later years. Table A-i presents a comparison between
the average daily carloadings and the volume of unshipped freight
in 1930-31.
TABLE A-i
AVERAGE I)AILY CARLOADINGS AND BACKLOG OF UNSHIPPED FREIGHT, 1950-31
(thousand cars in 2-axle units)
ADC Backlog
1930 1931 1930 1931
January 42.8 38.8 3 50
February 42.3 36.0 3 83
March 45.9 43.9 15 112
April 48.1 49.3 14 92
May 48.4 51.5 52
June 51.0 54.6 1 7
July 47.5 52.4 2 13
August 45.0 51.1 14
September 46.7 53.7 3 37
October 48.3 55.0 8 45
November 47.2 55.4 14 49
December 42.6 49.6 21 52
SouRcE: ADC, 62, 340; backlog, figures read off a diagram in 7, 1952, No. 9-10, 1.
The core of the transportation problem in 1985-34 becomes apparent
when we compare the rate of growth of heavy industry with the
performance of railroads (Tables A-2 and A-3). Average daily car-
loadings increased 11 per cent in the first quarter of 1934 compared to
the first quarter of 1933, 8 per cent in the second, 9percent in the
third, and 6 per cent in the fourth. The performance indexes also















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Coal 190,1 245.9 201.0 248.9 206.6 274.5 231.6 272.1
Coke 23.6 34.7 27.7 88.8 29.9 40.5 80.9 41.6
Ores 33.2 46.8 37.6 58.9 43.7 65.8 46.3 69.6
Pig Iron15.4 24.8 19.4 28,9 21.1 29.7 21.8 30.5
Steel 156 23.4 17.8 26.1 19.9 26.4 21.5 28.9
SouRcE: 6, 1935, No. 11, 6.
the output of heavy industry (Table A.3), these increments appear
negligible indeed. The first quarter showed a marked increase of
28 to 50 per cent, the second quarter of 23 to 60 per cent, the third
quarter of 19 to 50 per cent, and the fourth quarter of 22 to 50 per cent.
The quarterly increases in industrial output of major commodities
were several times as great as the growth of railroad freight traffic in
the corresponding period.
Moreover, the railroads had to carry more and more supplies of
machinery and oil products for mechanized agriculture and a larger
share of the marketed crops as the result of collectivization. At the
same time, the transportation of lumber and oil was shifted from
river to rail:road. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
a backlog of unshipped freight several times as great as the average
daily carloadings could accumulate and last for long periods.
During this time, the railroads operated with great deficiencies,
which, in the words of a Soviet writer,2 resulted in "an increased
number of catastrophes and accidents, long turnaround time of
rolling stock, long detention of freight cars at all types of stations
(classification, divisional, freight, and way stations), low technical and
average section speeds, nonscheduled movement of trains, insufficient
introduction of full trainload lots, and the absence of a real drive to
speed up freight car and locomotive turnaround time."
The Soviet writer continues:3
The overwhelming majority of railroad workers, including most
of the M:inistry and railroad agency officials, were convinced that
the railroads were operating at the extreme limits of their technical
resources and that the goal of 61,000 to 63,000 average daily car-
loadings was the upper limit of their performance.
26, 1935, No.11, 7.
86, 1935, N'o. 11, 7.
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The Scientific Research Institute for Railroad Operation and its
"theorists" and "researchers" attempted to prove that the railroads
were operating at the "limit" and that their performance could not
be improved until industry provided new freight cars and the rolling
stock was equipped with automatic brakes and automatic couplings.
These were the reasons for the poor performance of railroads.
Neither. the Ministry, nor the railroads, nor the research institutes
tried to improve organization of operations; they did not even
study the technical resources of railroads.
These often repeated official Soviet arguments and explanations of
the 1933-34 transportation crisis are followed by an even more startling
declaration of the magic power of L. M. Kaganovich, who apparently
was responsible for the rapid recovery of transportation in 1935-86.
The Soviet writer from the Ministry describes the immediate cause
for the recovery in the following words:4
•..andthen came the history-making day for railroad transporta-
tion: February 28, 1935. The Party and the government ordered
Stalin's close frien4—Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich—to take over
railroad transportation.
•.•assoon as his Boishevist hand, firm and organizing, touched
the work, technical transportation resources began to be properly
utilized and the management and mobilization of all the leading
railroad workers started to be organized efficiently. As a result, the
railroads overfulfilled their plan, for the first time, in April, by
loading 61,977 cars a day.
There was indeed a marked increase in average daily carloadings
in 1935-36 over 1933-34, but whether this was the result of the intra-
transportation purges and the pressure applied by Kaganovich or
other determining factors is another matter. Evidence indicates that
the latter is at least as probable as the former. Table A-4 shows that
there was an increase in the average daily carloadings before Kagan-
ovich took over.This increase can be analyzed by breakingit
down by causal factors. When the total increase in ADC from
January to September of 1935 (24,003 freight cars per day)is dis-
tributed among the factors shown in Table A-5, it can be seen that it
resulted primarily from a decrease in turnaround time of freight cars
rather than from an increase in the active fleet.
46, 1935, No. 11, 7.
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• TABLE A-4
AVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGS, 1933-36,BY.MONTH
(thousand cars in 2-axle units)
1933 1934 1935 1936
January 46.3 51.8 50.7 77.6
February 46.4 53.1 56.1 76.4
March 48.3 52.0 59.2 86.7
April 52.2 55.4 62.0 89.0
May 53.8 57.2 69.3 92.4
June 51.9 57.8 72.7 89.9
July 50.0 56.7 73.0 90.4
SOURCE: 26, 431.
TABLE A-5 .
BREAKDOWN or INCR.EASE IN AVERAGE DAILY CARL0ADINGsIN 1935BYCAUSAL FACrORS
(cars in 2-axle units)
Increase in active freight car fleet 1,537
Increase in average section speed and '
decrease in time spent in motion 6,798
Decrease in demurrage of cars at loading
and unloading stations .. 4,450
Decrease in demurrage of cars at divisional
and classification stations 11,217.
Total 24,002
SouRcE: Derived from data in 6, 1935, No. 11, 10, and 26, 61.
The reduction of the average full freight car turnaround trip by
60 kms5 from February to September of 1935 did reduce the turn-
around time in general and the demurrage at classification and
divisional stations in particular (since .the number of times the cars
were worked at these stations was also lower). The equipping of all
freight cars with hose(to connect the locomotive with automatic
brake cars) also reduced the demurrage at classification stations. The
extent to which the detention of freight cars at technical stations
was reducedL in 1935 is shown in Table A-6.
The improvement from 1934 to 1935 was not greater but rather
less than from 1938 to 1934, as indicated by official Soviet statistics.
It will be shown later that at some of that reduction in turn-
around time was obtained by deliberate understatement of the active
fleet of freight cars.
The reduction in time spent in trains from January' 'to September




DETENTION OF FREIGHT CARS AT DIVISIONAL AND CLASSIFICATION STATIONS, 1933•35
(hours)
1933 1934 1935
January 13.2 11.7 10.8
February 18.2 10.4 8.3
March 13.1 9.6 8.2
April 11.5 8.7 8.0
May 10.8 8.1 7.1
June 11.0 8.9 7.0
July 10.9 8.2 7.1
August 10.7 8.1 7.5




SouRCE: 6, 1985, No. 11, 9.
minor extent (if we ignore seasonal improvement), by a decrease in
time spent at way stations (compare Tables A-7 and A-li below).
Higher train speeds must have had an important part in increasing
locomotive-kilometers per locomotive-day as well as inincreasing
TABLE A-7
TRAIN ANDROLLING PERFORMANCE, 1935
Average Average Loco-Kms perFreight Car
Technical Section Loco-Day in Kilometers
Speed of Speed of Train Speed Freight per Active
Freight Trains Freight TrainsCoefficient Service Freight Car
(kms/hr) (kins/hr) Day
January 21.5 12.9 0.60 153.0 101.2
February 22.2 13.8 0.62 166.2 119.5
March . 22.7 14.3 0.63 170.8 125.1
April 23.1 14.9 0,65 175.0 127.9
May 23.4 15.2 0.65 181.2 137.1
June 23.8 15.5 0.65 187.8 140.8
July 24.0 15.7 0.65 191.4 138.7
August 24.4 16.0 0.66 196.8 1353
September 25.2 16.8 0.67 207.0 135.0
SOURCE: 65, 429.
0
freightcar-kilometers per active freight car. The latter index, however,
might have been even more affectedthe general Soviet practice
of understating the active fleet of freight cars in daily statistical
reporting. The performance of the rolling stock in 1935 is shown by
month in Tables A-7 and A-8. It should be borne in mind, however,
that the seasonal variations have not been eliminated from these
series.It is not proper to follow the method used by Isaev6 and
66, 1985, No. 11.
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TABLE A-B





Average Half July 'AugustSeptember
Gross ton-kms per locomo-
tive in freight service 136.5 145.6 162.7
Loco.kms per loco-day in
freight service 168.6 178.1 191.4 196.5 207.0
Detention at the main engine
house (houn) 8.81 7.9 7.12 5.41
Detention at the turning
engine house (hours) 8.09 8.09 7.49 5.90 5.50
SouRcE: 6, 1935, No. 11, 10.
compare the performance of railroads in September with that in
January without making an allowance for the seasonal variations
which tended to overemphasize the improvements achieved in Septem-
ber 1935.
Comparing and analyzing the annual data for 1934 and 1985, we
find the improvements much less pronounced. The average daily
carloadings by 12,376 from 1934 to 1935, compared to a
24,003 increase from January to September 1935. The distribution by
causal factors of these increments was also quite different in the two
cases. The increase in average daily carloadings attributable to the
increase in the active fleet of freight cars was only 6.4 per cent
(1,537 cars) of the total increase in ADC from January to September
1935, and 33.3 per cent (4,127 cars) from 1934 to 1935. The remaining
increases of 94.6 per cent and 66.7 per cent were due to the reduction
in turnaround time of freight cars in the respective periods. The
breakdown of turnaround time of freight cars and the distribution
of the increa,e of average daily carloadings from 1934 tO 1935 are given
in Tables A-9 and A-b.
TABLE A-9
AVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGS AND BREAKDOWN OF TLIRIJAROUND
TIME OF FREIGHT CARS, 1934-35
: 1934 1935 Difference
ADC (cars) 55,717 68,093 +12,376
Freight car turnaround (days) 8.75 7.69 —1.06
Active fleet of cars 487,524 523,635 +36,111
Total freight car turnaround(hrs.) 210.7 184.6 —26.1
Time in trains(hrs.) 72.5 63.3 —9.2
Time at technical stations 92.2 82.5 —9.7




BREAKDOWN OF INCREASEINAVERAGE DAILY CARLOADINGS BY CAUSAL FACTORS, 1934-35
Total increase in ADC in 1935 (annual average) 12,576
Change in ADC produced by increase in
the active fleet of freight cars 4,127
Change in ADC produced by decrease in
turnaround time 8,249
Decrease of time in trains 2,907
Change in the detention time at
technical stations 3,065
Change in the detention time in
loading and unloading 2,275
Total increase in ADC (difference due to rounding) 12,574
SouRcE: Computed from Table A-9.
In considering the possible reasons for the above reduction in turn-
around time of 1.06 days, we have to note first a decline of 42 kilo-
meters in the average total freight car turnaround trip from 1934 to
1935, which explains in part the decrease in total turnaround time
(by 26.1 hours), in part the reduction in detention time of freight
cars at technical stations (by 9.7 hours), and in part the reduction
in time spent in trains (by 9.2 hours) as explained above. Time spent
in trains was decreased by the improvement in train speed coefficient
(i.e., reduced demurrage of cars at way stations) and by some increase
in the technical speed of trains. It was in 1936 and not in 1935 that
the technical speed was increased by the upward revision of maximum
boiler pressure norms for different locomotives. Table A-i 1 illustrates
this point quite clearly.
TABLE A-il








1913 16.5 13.6 0.82
1928 21.1 14.1 0.67
1930 21.8 12.2 0.56
1932 25.0 14.3 0.62













SOURCE; Series C-18 and C-19 in Appendix C.
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Analysis of railroad performance, supplemented by an analysis of
capital investment in the form of new freight cars and locomotives,
gives us a detailed picture of the events during the transportation
crisis in 193.3-34 and suggests some possible explanations for the
improvement: and the higher level of performance maintained in
later years. Tables A-12 and A-13 show the extent to which the de-
liveries of new locomotives and new freight cars increased in this
period. The cumulative effect of rolling stock deliveries before the
peak in 1935 should also be taken into consideration in evaluating
the full impact of these capital investments. The total carrying
capacity of freight cars and the total tractive effort of locomotives
increased more rapidly than the number of physical units because
of the addition of more powerful locomotives and heavier freight
cars to stocks.Comparing the production and deliveries of new
freight cars to the increases in the active fleet, we can gain some
insight into how much the latter had been understated (or possibly
overstated) in the current statistical reporting of railroads. The active
fleet is less inclusive than the fleet under railroad jurisdiction, which
covers the following categories of freight cars: active fleet, bad-order
cars, work train cars, storage and housing, special uses.
A direct c:omparison between the freight cars 'delivered and the
annual increases in the fleet under railroad jurisdiction, presented in
Table A-14, indicates that there is no pronounced tendency to under-
state either of the two fleets when an average rate of retirement of
2 per cent per year is assumed, except perhaps for 1935.On, the
contrary, in some years freight cars seem to come in from sources
other than production and repair of bad-order cars, even if we take
the annual rate of retirement as zero.
En order to take into account all the leakages and injections of
freight cars, we should compare the production and retirements with
the increases in the inventory fleet of cars, the most inclusive series.
The inventory fleet covers, in addition to all the categories in the
fleet under railroad jurisdiction, the freight cars in the ministry
reserve leased to other ministries and organizations and the freight
cars transferred to railroads under construction.However, in this
case it might be more appropriate to take cars produced rather than
cars delivered to railroads under the ministry jurisdiction. The com-
parison in Table A-15 shows less discrepancy between the increases
in the inventory fleet and the annual output of freight cars than in




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COMPARISON OF ANNUALCHANGES IN STOCKS OF FREIGHT CARS WITH
NEw FREIGHT CARS TO RAILROADS, 1928-37
ANNUAL DELIVERIES OF
(thousand 2-axle units)
Col. 1: 1928-29, 1952, 1937—Based on inventory freight
84, 469) and percentage of 4-axle units in total inventoryfleet
1.930-31, 1983—Based on fleet under railroad jurisdiction(series






Col. 1 plus col. 2.
Table A.13.
Col. 3 minus col. 4.
Estimated Total Total
Annual Annual Number of Number of
Annual Change inRetirementFreight Cars
ChangeAverage Fleetof FreightAccounted forTotal
in Average of Freight Cars from in Fleet Number of









1928 26.5 8.2 9.4 17.6 13.8 +3.8
1929 51.9 35.2 9.9 45.1 16.1 +29.0
1930 39.0 12.7 10.1 22.8 18.8 +4.0
1931 40.0 22.2 10.6 32.8 19.8 +13.0
1932 7.9 16.4 10.9 27.5 19.2 +8.1
1933 9.5 9.6 11.1 20.7 17.2 +3•5
1934 2.7 9.8 11.3 21.1 26.7 —5.6
1935 36.2 39.4 12.1 51.5 85.8 —33.8
1936 .60.5 70.0 18.5 . 88.5 67.2 +16.3
1937 42.8 48.6 14.5 63.1 . 59.0 +4.1
SOURCE: Table A-l3 and series C-26 and C-27 in Appendix C.
TABLE A-l5
COMPARISON OF ANNUAL CHANCES IN INVENTORY FLEET OF FREIGHT CARS WITHANNUAL
PRonucHoN OF NEW FREIGHT CARS, 1928-37
(thousand 2-axle units)
Estimated Total
Annual Total Number of
Annual Retirement Number of
Change in of Freight. Freight Cars Total




in Inventory Inventory in InventoryFreight Cars
Fleet Fleet. Fleet Produced
Inventory
Fleet
(1) (2) (8) (4) (5)
1928 80.1 10.0 40.1 12.1 +28.0
1929 17.4 10.4 27.8 16.7 +11.1
1930 12.0 10.6 22.6 20.9
1931 18.6 11.0 29.6 23.3




1933 15.0 11.6 26.6 18.9
1934 15.4 11.9 27.8 29.0 +77
—1.7
1935 48.0 19.9 67.9 85.7 —17.8
1936 33.9 14.2 48.1 67.2 —19.1




in physical Units (29, 201;
C-28inAppendix C);
Appendix C) and inter-
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The positive discrepancy (Table A-IS, column 5) probably reflects
in part an overstatement (and the negative discrepancy an under-
statement) in the assumed 2 per cent per annum rate of retirements,
and in part deficiencies in basic statistical data on stocks.
Bearing in mind the implications of these findings, we shall continue
our analysis of the 1933-34 transportation crisis. The data in Table
A-15 permit us to make allowances in the active fleet of freight cars
for the probable understatement of the increase in the active fleet in
1985. Subtracting the annual increase of 36,200 cars and the 2 per cent
retirement of 10,500 cars in the active fleet from the number of cars
delivered to railroads during 1935(all in 2-axle units), we get a
rough approximation of the number of cars in the actual active fleet
that the railroads failed to report in their current statistics,i.e.,
38,600 cars.
A direct comparison of the increase in the active fleet and the cars
delivered to railroads(after allowance for, retirements)might be
justified for1935. The backlog of unshipped freight and the high
pressure put on railroads to increase average daily carloadings in
1933-35 make transfers of large numbers of freight cars from the
active fleet (or the inclusion of newly produced and delivered cars)
to other categories of the fleet under railroad jurisdiction highly im-
probable. This proposition is supported by the relatively insignificant
discrepancy between the increments in the active fleet and the increase
of only 32,000 cars in the fleet under railroad jurisdiction in 1985.
Adding 88,600 cars to the reported active fleet of 523,700, we obtain
an adjusted active fleet of 562,300, which makes it possible to compute
adjusted turnaround time and to distribute the increment in the
average daily carloadings by causal factors.The results of these
are given in Table A-16.
TABLE A.16
BREAKDOWN OF INCREASE IN AVERAGE DAILY CAIu,oAnlNcs IN 1935 CAUSAL
FACTORS, BASED ON Ac'rlvE FLEET
(2-axleunits)
1934 1935 Difference
ADC (cars) 55,717 68,093 12,376
Freight car turnaround (days) 8.75 [8.261 .49
Active fleet of freight cars 487,524 562,300 74,776
Change in ADC produced by '
the increase in the active
fleet of fretght cars (cars) 8,546
Change in ABC produced by




The causal factors for the ADCincrement,as presented in Table
A-16, shifted in favor of the increment in the inventory fleet of freight
cars rather than in favor of the reduction in turnaround time as
shown in Table A-b, according to official Soviet statistics.This
finding suggests the final answer to the question posed at the beginning
of this appendix, namely whether the increases in railroad investments
or the better utilization of the available rolling stock were primarily
responsible for the sharp and sustained increase in the average daily
carloadings and in the volume of freight traffic in 1935.
These findings should be considered as suggestions rather than as
final conclusions. Further research is needed, especially to compare
different categories of freight car stock with the production data to
determine how much railroad performance is exaggerated in Soviet
statistics, a problem of great importance, but not of primary interest
here.
155